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Reflecting about Selecting Noninformative Priors
Kaniav Kamary · Christian. P. Robert
Abstract Following the critical review of Seaman III et al (2012), we reflect on
what is presumably the most essential aspect of Bayesian statistics, namely the
selection of a prior density. In some cases, Bayesian inference remains fairly stable
under a large range of noninformative prior distributions. However, as discussed by
Seaman III et al (2012), there may also be unintended consequences of a choice of a
noninformative prior and, these authors consider this problem ignored in Bayesian
studies. As they based their argumentation on four examples, we reassess these
examples and their Bayesian processing via different prior choices. Our conclusion
is to lower the degree of worry about the impact of the prior, exhibiting an overall
stability of the posterior distributions. We thus consider that the warnings of
Seaman III et al (2012), while commendable, do not jeopardize the use of most
noninformative priors.
Keywords Induced prior · Logistic model · Bayesian methods · Stability · Prior
distribution
1 Introduction
The choice of a particular prior for the Bayesian analysis of a statistical model is
often seen more as an art than as a science. When the prior cannot be derived from
the available information, it is generaly constructed as a noninformative prior. This
derivation is mostly mathematical and, even though the corresponding posterior
distribution has to be proper and hence constitutes a correct probability density,
it nonetheless leaves the door open to criticism. The focus of this note is the
paper by Seaman III et al (2012), where the authors consider using a particular
noninformative distribution as a problem in itself, often bypassed by users of these
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priors: “if parameters with diffuse proper priors are subsequently transformed,
the resulting induced priors can, of course, be far from diffuse, possibly resulting
in unintended influence on the posterior of the transformed parameters” (p.77).
Using the inexact argument that most problems rely on MCMC methods and
hence require proper priors, the authors restrict the focus to those priors.
In their critical study, Seaman III et al (2012) investigate the negative side
effects of some specific prior choices related with specific examples. Our note aims
at re-examining their investigation and at providing a more balanced discussion on
these side effects. We first stress that a prior is considered as informative by Seaman
III et al (2012) “to the degree it renders some values of the quantity of interest more
likely than others” (p.77), and with this definition, when comparing two priors, the
prior that is more informative is deemed preferable. In contrast with this definition,
we consider that an informative prior expresses specific, definite (prior) information
about the parameter, providing quantitative information that is crucial to the
estimation of a model through restrictions on the prior distribution (Robert, 2007).
However, in most practical cases, a model parameter has no substance per se
but instead calibrates the probability law of the random phenomenon observed
therein. The prior is thus a tool that summarizes the information available on
this phenomenon, as well as the uncertainty within the Bayesian structure. Many
discussions can be found in the literature on how appropriate choices between
the prior distributions can be decided. In this case, robustness considerations also
have an important role to play (Lopes and Tobias, 2011; Stojanovski and Nur,
2011). This point of view will be obvious in this note as, e.g., in processing a
logistic model in the following section. Within the sole setting of the examples
first processed in Seaman III et al (2012), we do exhibit a greater stability in the
posterior distributions through various noninformative priors.
The plan of the note is as follows: we first provide a brief review of nonin-
formative priors in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose a Bayesian analysis of a
logistic model (Seaman III et al.’s (2012) first example) by choosing the normal
distribution N(0, σ2) as the regression coefficient prior. We then compare it with
a g-prior, as well as flat and Jeffreys’ priors, concluding to the stability of our
results. The next sections cover the second to fourth examples of Seaman III et al
(2012), modeling covariance matrices, treatment effect in biomedical studies, and
a multinomial distribution. When modeling covariance matrices, we compare two
default priors for the standard deviations of the model coefficients. In the multi-
nomial setting, we discuss the hyperparameters of a Dirichlet prior. Finally, we
conclude with the argument that the use of noninformative priors is reasonable
within a fair range and that they provide efficient Bayesian estimations when the
information about the parameter is vague or very poor.
2 Noninformative priors
As mentioned above, when prior information is unavailable and if we stick to
Bayesian analysis, we need to resort to one of the so-called noninformative priors.
Since we aim at a prior with minimal impact on the final inference, we define a
noninformative prior as a statistical distribution that expresses vague or general
information about the parameter in which we are interested. In constructive terms,
the first rule for determining a noninformative prior is the principle of indifference,
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using uniform distributions which assign equal probabilities to all possibilities
(Laplace, 1820). This distribution is however not invariant under reparametrization
(see Berger, 1980; Robert, 2007, for references). If the problem does not allow for
an invariance structure, Jeffreys’ (1939) priors, then reference priors, exploit the
probabilistic structure of the problem under study in a more formalised way. Other
methods have been advanced, like the little-known data-translated likelihood of
Box and Tiao (2011), maxent priors (Jaynes, 2003), minimum description length
priors (Rissanen, 2012) and probability matching priors (Welch and Peers, 1963).
Bernardo and Smith (2009) envision noninformative priors as a mere mathe-
matical tool, while accepting their feature of minimizing the impact of the prior
selection on inference: “Put bluntly, data cannot ever speak entirely for themselves,
every prior specification has some informative posterior or predictive implications
and vague is itself much too vague an idea to be useful. There is no “objective”
prior that represents ignorance” (p.298). There is little to object against this quote
since, indeed, prior distributions can never be quantified or elicited exactly, espe-
cially when no information is available on those parameters. Hence, the concept of
“true” prior is meaningless and the quantification of prior beliefs operates under
uncertainty. As stressed by Berger (1984), noninformative priors enjoy the advan-
tage that they can be considered to provide robust solutions to relevant problems
even though “the user of these priors should be concerned with robustness with
respect to the class of reasonable noninformative priors” (p.59).
3 Example 1: Bayesian analysis of the logistic model
The first example in Seaman III et al (2012) is a standard logistic regression
modelling the probability of coronary heart disease as dependent on the age x by
ρ(x) =
exp(α+ βx)
1 + exp(α+ βx)
. (1)
First we recall the original discussion in Seaman III et al (2012) and then run our
own analysis by selecting some normal priors as well as the g-prior, the flat prior
and Jeffreys’ prior.
3.1 Seaman et al.’s (2012) analysis
For both parameters of the model (1), Seaman III et al (2012) chose a normal prior
N(0, σ2). A first surprising feature in this choice is to opt for an identical prior
on both intercept and slope coefficients, instead of, e.g., a g-prior (discussed in
the following) that would rescale each coefficient according to the variation of the
corresponding covariate. Indeed, since x corresponds to age, the second term βx in
the regression varies 50 times more than the intercept. When plotting logistic cdf’s
induced by a few thousands simulations from the prior, those cumulative functions
mostly end up as constant functions with the extreme values 0 and 1. This be-
haviour is obviously not particularly realistic since the predicted phenomenon is
the occurrence of coronary heart disease. Under this minimal amount of informa-
tion, the prior is thus using the wrong scale: the simulated cdfs should have a
reasonable behavior over the range (20, 100) of the covariate x. For instance, it
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should focus on a −5 log-odds ratio at age 20 and a +5 log-odds ratio at 100,
leading to the comparison pictured in Figure 1 (left versus right). Furthermore,
the fact that the coefficient of x may be negative also bypasses a basic item of in-
formation about the model and answers the later self-criticism in Seaman III et al
(2012) that the prior probability that the ED50 is negative is 0.5. Using instead
a flat prior would answer the authors’ criticisms about the prior behavior, as we
now demonstrate.
Fig. 1 Logistic cdfs across a few thousans simulations from the normal prior, when using the
prior selected by Seaman III et al (2012) (left) and the prior defined as the G-prior(right)
We stress that Seaman III et al (2012) produce no further justification for the
choice of the prior variance σ2 = 252, other than there is no information about the
model parameters. This is a completely arbitrary choice of prior, arbitrariness that
does have a considerable impact on the resulting inference, as already discussed.
Seaman III et al (2012) further criticized the chosen prior by comparing both
posterior mode and posterior mean derived from the normal prior assumption
with the MLE. If the MLE is the golden standard there then one may wonder
about the relevance of a Bayesian analysis! When the sample size N gets large,
most simple Bayesian analyses based on noninformative prior distributions give
results similar to standard non-Bayesian approaches (Gelman et al, 2013). For
instance, we can often interpret classical point estimates as exact or approximate
posterior summaries based on some implicit full probability model. Therefore, as
N increases, the influence of the prior on posterior inferences decreases and, when
N goes to infinity, most priors lead to the same inference. However, for smaller
sample sizes, it is inappropriate to summarize inference about the parameter by
one value like the mode or the mean, especially when the posterior distribution of
the parameter is more variable or even asymmetric.
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Table 1 Posterior estimates of the logistic parameters using a normal prior when σ =
10, 25, 100, 900
σ = 10
αˆ βˆ
mean s.d mean s.d
3.482 11.6554 -0.0161 0.0541
σ = 25
18.969 24.119 -0.0882 0.1127
σ = 100
137.63 64.87 -0.6404 0.3019
σ = 900
237.2 86.12 -1.106 0.401
The dataset used here to infer on (α, β) is the Swiss banknote benchmark
(available in R). The response variable y indicates the state of the banknote, i.e.
whether the bank note is genuine or counterfeit. The explanatory variable is the
bill length. This data yields the maximum likelihood estimates α˜ = 233.26 and
β˜ = −1.09. To check the impact of the normal prior variance, we used a random
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm as in Marin and Robert (2007) and derived the
estimators reproduced in Table 1. We can spot definitive changes in the results that
are caused by moves in the coefficient σ, hence concluding to the clear sensitivity
of the posterior to the choice of hyperparameter σ (see also Figure 2).
Fig. 2 Posterior distributions of the logistic parameter α when priors are N(0, σ) for σ =
10, 25, 100, 900, based on 104 MCMC simulations.
3.2 Larger classes of priors
Normal priors are well-know for their lack of robustness (see e.g. Berger, 1984)
and the previous section demonstrates the long-term impact of σ. However, we
can limit variations in the posteriors, using the g-priors of Zellner (1986),
α, β | X ∼ N2(0, g(XTX)−1). (2)
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Table 2 Posterior estimates of the logistic parameters under a g-prior, a flat prior and Jeffreys’
prior for the banknote benchmark. Posterior means and standard deviations remain quite
similar under all priors. All point estimates are averages of MCMC samples of size 104.
g-prior
αˆ βˆ
mean s.d mean s.d
237.63 88.0377 -1.1058 0.4097
Flat prior
236.44 85.1049 -1.1003 0.3960
Jeffreys’ prior
237.24 87.0597 -1.1040 0.4051
where the prior variance-covariane matrix is a scalar multiple of the information
matrix for the linear regression. This coefficient g plays a decisive role in the
analysis, however large values of g imply a more diffuse prior and, as shown e.g.
in Marin and Robert (2007), if the value of g is large enough, the Bayes estimate
stabilizes. We will select g as equal to the sample size 200, following Liang et al
(2008), as it means that the amount of information about the parameter is equal
to the amount of information contained in one single observation.
A second reference prior is the flat prior pi(α, β) = 1. And Jeffreys’ prior
constitutes our third prior as in Marin and Robert (2007). In the logistic case,
Fisher’s information matrix is I(α, β,X) = XTWX, where X = {xir} is the
design matrix, W = diag{mipii(1− pii)} and mi is the binomial index for the ith
count (Firth, 1993). This leads to Jeffreys’ prior {det(I(α, β,X))}1/2, proportional
to[
n∑
i=1
exp(α+ βxi)
{1 + exp(α+ βxi)}2
n∑
i=1
x2i exp(α+ βxi)
{1 + exp(α+ βxi)}2 −
{
n∑
i=1
xiexp(α+ βxi)
{1 + exp(α+ βxi)}2
}2] 12
This is a nonstandard distribution on (α, β) but it can be easily approximated by a
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm whose proposal is the normal Fisher approximation
of the likelihood, as in Marin and Robert (2007).
Bayesian estimates of the regression coefficients associated with the above three
noninformative priors are summarized in Table 2. Those estimates vary quite mod-
erately from one choice to the next, as well as relatively to the MLEs and to the
results shown in Table 1 when σ = 900. Figure 3 is even more definitive about this
stability of Bayesian inferences under different noninformative prior choices.
4 Example 2: Modeling covariance matrices
The second choice of prior criticized by Seaman III et al (2012), was proposed by
Barnard et al (2000) for the modeling of covariance matrices. However the paper
falls short of demonstrating a clear impact of this prior modelling on posterior in-
ference. Furthermore the adeopted solution of using another proper prior resulting
in a “wider” dispersion requires a prior knowledge of how wide is wide enough.
We thus run Bayesian analyses considering prior beliefs specified by both Seaman
III et al (2012) and Barnard et al (2000).
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Fig. 3 Posterior distributions of the parameters of the logistic model when the prior is
N(0, 9002), g-prior, flat prior and Jeffreys’ prior, respectively. The estimated posterior dis-
tributions are based on 104 MCMC iterations.
4.1 Setting
The multivariate regression model of Barnard et al (2000) is
Yj | Xj , βj , τj ∼ N(Xjβj , τ2j Inj ), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (3)
where Yj is a vector of nj dependent variables, Xj is an nj ×k matrix of covariate
variables, and βj is a k-dimensional parameter vector. For this model, Barnard
et al (2000) considered an iid normal distribution as the prior
βj ∼ N(β¯, Σ)
conditional on β¯, Σ where β¯, τ2j for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m are independent and follow a
normal and inverse-gamma priors, respectively. Assuming that β¯, τ2j ’s and Σ are
a priori independent, Barnard et al (2000) firstly provide a full discussion on how
to choose a prior for Σ because it determines the nature of the shrinkage of the
posterior of the individual βj is towards a common target. The covariance matrix
Σ is defined as a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements S, multiplied by a k× k
correlation matrix R,
Σ = diag(S)Rdiag(S) .
Note that S is the k × 1 vector of standard deviations of the βjs, (S1, . . . , Sk).
Barnard et al (2000) propose lognormal distributions as priors on Sj . The correla-
tion matrix could have (1) a joint uniform prior p(R) ∝ 1, or (2) a marginal prior
obtained from the inverse-Wishart distribution for Σ which means p(R) is derived
from the integral over S1, . . . , Sk of a standard inverse-Wishart distribution. In
the second case, all the marginal densities for rij are uniform when i 6= j (Barnard
et al, 2000).
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Considering the case of a single regressor, i.e. k = 2, Seaman III et al (2012)
chose a different prior structure, with a flat prior on the correlations and a log-
normal prior with means 1 and −1, and standard deviations 1 and 0.5 on the
standard deviations of the intercept and slope, respectively. Simulating from this
prior, they concluded at a high concentration near zero. They then suggested that
the lognormal distribution should be replaced by a gamma distribution G(4, 1)
as it implies a more diffuse prior. The main question here is whether or not the
induced prior is more diffuse should make us prefer gamma to lognormal as a prior
for Sj , as discussed below.
4.2 Prior beliefs
First, Barnard et al.’s (2000) basic modeling intuition is “that each regression is
a particular instance of the same type of relationship” (p.1292). This means an
exchangeabile prior belief on the regression parameters. As an example, they sup-
pose that m regressions are similar models where each regression corresponds to
a different firm in the same industry branch. Exploiting this assumption, when βj
has a normal prior like βij ∼ N(β¯i, σ2i ), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, the standard deviation of
βij (Si = σi) should be small as well so “that the coefficient for the ith explana-
tory variable is similar in the different regressions” (p.1293). In other words, Si
concentrated on small values implies little variation in the ith coefficient. Toward
this goal, Barnard et al (2000) chose a prior concentrated close to zero for the
standard deviation of the slope so that the posterior of this coefficient would be
shrunken together across the regressions. Based on this basic idea and taking tight
priors on Σ for βj , j = 1, . . . ,m, they investigated the shrinkage of the posterior
on βj as well as the degree of similarity of the slopes. Their analysis showed that
a standard deviation prior that is more concentrated on small values results in
substantial shrinkage in the coefficients relative to other prior choices.
Consider for instance the variation between the choices of lognormal and gamma
distributions as priors of S2, standard deviation of the regression slope. Figure 4
compares the lognormal prior with mean −1 and standard deviation 0.5 and the
gamma distribution G(4, 1).
In this case, most of the mass of the lognormal prior is concentrated on values
close to zero whereas the gamma prior is more diffuse. The 10, 50, 90 percentiles of
LN(−1, 0.5) and G(4, 1) are 0.19, 0.37, 0.7 and 1.74, 3.67, 6.68, respectively. Thus,
choosing LN(−1, 0.5) as the prior of S2 is equivalent to believe that values of β2
in the m regressions are much closer together than the situation where we assume
S2 ∼ G(4, 1). To assess the difference between both prior choices on S2 and their
impact on the degree of similarity of the regression coefficients, we resort to a
simulated example, similar to Barnard et al (2000), except thatm = 4 and nj = 36.
The explanatory variables are simulated standard normal variates. We also take
τj ∼ IG(3, 1) and β¯ ∼ N(0, 1000I). The prior for Σ is such that pi(R) ∝ 1 and we
run Seaman et al.’s (2012) analyses under S2 ∼ LN(−1, 0.5) and S2 ∼ G(4, 1).
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Fig. 4 Comparison of lognormal and gamma priors for the standard deviation of the regression
slope.
4.3 Comparison of posterior outputs
As seen in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The differences between the regression
estimates are quite limited from one prior to the next, while the estimates of the
standard deviations vary much more. In the lognormal case, the posterior of Si is
concentrated on smaller values relative to the gamma prior. Figure 5 displays the
posterior distributions of those parameters. the impact of the prior choice is quite
clear on the standard deviations. Therefore, since the posteriors of both intercepts
and slopes for all four regressions are centered in (16.5, 17) and (−10,−9), respec-
tively, we can conclude at the stability of Bayesian inferences on βj when selecting
two different prior distributions on Sj . That the posteriors on the Si’s differ is in
fine natural since those are hyperparameters that are poorly informed by the data,
thus reflecting more the modelling choices of the experimenter.
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Table 3 Posterior estimations of regression coefficients when their standard deviations are
distributed as LN(−1, 0.5) and G(4, 1).
Si ∼ LN(−1, 0.5)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Estimate mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d
Intercept 16.74 0.17 16.72 0.17 16.79 1.09 16.82 0.69
Slope -9.27 0.42 -9.47 0.25 -9.66 0.98 -9.63 0.45
Si ∼ G(4, 1)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Estimate mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d
Intercept 16.73 0.23 16.73 0.22 16.85 0.37 16.76 0.32
Slope -9.30 0.30 -9.47 0.34 -9.73 0.23 -9.64 0.80
Table 4 Posterior estimations standard deviations of the regression coefficients when their
priors are distributed as LN(−1, 0.5) versus G(4, 1).
Si ∼ LN(−1, 0.5)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Estimate mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d
S1 0.43 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.42 0.26 0.41 0.24
S2 0.42 0.27 0.43 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.32
Si ∼ G(4, 1)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Estimate mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d mean s.d
S1 2.31 1.28 2.33 1.29 2.29 1.29 2.29 1.26
S2 2.32 1.29 2.23 1.28 2.25 1.23 2.30 1.26
Fig. 5 Estimated posterior densities of the regression intercept (top left), slope (top right),
standard deviation of the intercept (down left) and standard deviation of the slope (down
right), respectively for 4 different normal regressions. All estimates based on 105 iterations
that were simulated from a Gibbs sampler.
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5 Examples 3 and 4: Prior choices for a proportion and the
multinomial coefficients
This section considers more briefly the third and fourth examples of Seaman III
et al (2012). The third example relates to a treatment effect analyzed by Cowles
(2002) and the fourth one covers a standard multinomial setting.
5.1 Proportion of treatment effect captured
In Cowles (2002) two models are compared for surrogate endpoints, using a link
function g that either includes the surrogate marker or not. The quantity of interest
is a proportion of treatment effect captured: it is defined as PTE ≡ 1 − β1/βR,1,
where β1, βR,1 are the coefficients of an indicator variable for treatment in the first
and second regression models under comparison, respectively. Seaman III et al
(2012) restricted this proportion to the interval (0, 1) and under this assumption
they proposed to use a generalised beta distribution on β1, βR,1 so that PTE stayed
within (0, 1).
We find this example most intringuing in that, even if PTE could be turned
into a meaningful quantity (given that it depends on parameters from different
models), the criticism that it may take values outside (0, 1) is rather dead-born
since it suffices to impose a joint prior that ensures the ratio stays within (0, 1).
This actually is the solution eventually proposed by the authors. If we have prior
beliefs about the parameter space (which depends on β1/βR,1 in this example)
the prior specified on the quantity of interest should integrate these beliefs. In the
current setting, there is seemingly no prior information about (β1, βR,1) and hence
imposing a prior restriction to (0, 1) is not a logical specification. For instance,
using normal priors on β1 and βR,1 lead to a Cauchy prior on β1/βR,1, which
support is not limited to (0, 1). We will not discuss this rather artificial example
any further.
5.2 Multinomial model and evenness index
The final example in Seaman III et al (2012) deals with a measure called evenness
index H(θ) = −∑ θi log(θi)/log(K) that is a function of a vector θ of proportions
θi, i = 1, . . . ,K. The authors assume a Dirichlet prior on θ with hyperparame-
ters first equal to 1 then to 0.25. For the transform H(θ), Figure 6 shows that
the first prior concentrates on (0.5, 1) whereas the second does not. Since there
is nothing special about the uniform prior, re-running the evaluation with the
Jeffreys prior reduces this feature, which anyway is a characteristic of the prior
distribution, not of a posterior distribution that would account for the data. The
authors actually propose to use the Dir(1/4, 1/4, . . . , 1/4) prior, presumably on
the basis that the induced prior on the evenness is then centered close to 0.5. If
we consider the more generic Dir(γ1, . . . , γK) prior, we can investigate the im-
pact of the γi’s when they move from 0.1 to 1. In Figure 6, the induced priors
on H(θ) indeed show a decreasing concentration of the posterior on (0.5, 1) as γi
decreases towards zero. To further the comparison, we generated datasets of size
N = 50, 100, 250, 1000, 10, 000. Figure 7 shows the posteriors associated with each
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of the four Dirichlet priors for these samples, including modes that are all close to
0.4 when N = 104. Even for moderate sample sizes like 50, the induced posteriors
are almost similar. When the sample size is 50, Table 5 shows there is some degree
of variation between the posterior means, even though, as expected, this difference
vanishes when the sample size increases.
Note that, while Dirichlet distributions are conjugate priors, hence potentially
lacking in robustness, Jeffreys’s prior is a special case corresponding to γi = 1/K
(here K is equal to 8). Figure 8 reproduces the transform of Jeffreys’ prior for the
evenness index (left) and the induced posterior densities for the same values of N .
Since it is a special case of the above, the same features appear. A potential alter-
native we did not explore is to set a non-informative prior on the hyperparameters
of the Dirichlet distribution.
Fig. 6 Priors induced on the evenness index: Four Dirichlet prior are assigned to θ with
hyperparameters all equal to 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, based on 104 simulations.
6 Conclusion
In this note, we have reassessed the examples supporting the critical review of
Seaman III et al (2012), mostly showing that off-the-shelf noninformative priors
are not suffering from the shortcomings pointed out by those authors. Indeed, ac-
cording to the outcomes produced therein, those noninformative priors result in
stable posterior inferences and reasonable Bayesian estimations for the parameters
at hand. We thus consider the level of criticism found in the original paper rather
unfounded, as it either relies on a highly specific choice of a proper prior distribu-
tion or on bypassing basic prior information later used for criticism. The paper of
Seaman III et al (2012) concludes with recommendations for prior checks. These
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Fig. 7 Estimated posterior densities of H(θ) considering sample sizes of
50, 100, 250, 1000, 10, 000. They correspond to the priors on θ shown in Figure 6 and
are based on 104 posterior simulations. The vertical line indicates the mode of all posteriors
when sample size is large enough.
Table 5 Posterior means of H(θ) for the priors shown in Figure 6 and Jeffreys’ prior on θ
for sample sizes 50, 100, 250, 1000, 10, 000.
Sample size 50 100 250 1000 10,000
Dirichlet prior when γi = 0.1
Posterior mean 0.308 0.336 0.403 0.383 0.395
Dirichlet prior when γi = 0.25
Posterior mean 0.317 0.438 0.417 0.387 0.396
Dirichlet prior when γi = 0.5
Posterior mean 0.378 0.368 0.423 0.387 0.397
Dirichlet prior when γi = 1
Posterior mean 0.454 0.425 0.441 0.390 0.396
Jeffreys’ prior: γi = 0.125
Posterior mean 0.413 0.411 0.406 0.390 0.396
Posterior s.d 0.058 0.057 0.037 0.018 0.006
Fig. 8 Jeffreys’ prior and estimated posterior densities of H(θ) considering sample sizes
50, 100, 250, 1000, 10, 000. The posterior distributions are based on 104 posterior draws. The
vertical line indicates the mode of the posterior density when the sample size is 104.
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recommendations are mostly sensible if mainly expressing the fact that some prior
information is almost always available on some quantities of interest. Our sole
point of contention is the repeated and recommended reference to MLE, if only
because it implies assessing or building the prior from the data. The most spe-
cific (if related to the above) recommendation is to use conditional mean priors as
exposed by Christensen et al (2011). For instance, in the first (logistic) example,
this meant putting a prior on the cdfs at age 40 and age 60. The authors picked
a uniform in both cases, which sounds inconsistent with the presupposed shape of
the probability function.
In conclusion, we find there is nothing pathologically wrong with either the
paper of Seaman III et al (2012) or the use of “noninformative” priors! Looking
at induced priors on more intuitive transforms of the original parameters is a
commendable suggestion, provided some intuition or prior information is already
available on those. Using a collection of priors including reference or invariant
priors helps as well towards building a feeling about the appropriate choice or range
of priors and looking at the dataset induced by simulating from the corresponding
predictive cannot hurt.
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